Just a couple of other random comments on the replies that came immediately before my last two replies. . .

Again, by both Copernicus standards (it is, after all, his statement), and I would also think by Cogito standards (Justified ["judged to be unassailable"] True ["not known to be false" but "subject to disconfirmation"] Belief) -- a reasonable definition.

Epistemic justification is never unassailable if by "unassailable" you mean "impossible to prove wrong." It is always conceded that any claim made about the world can be mistaken. Justification for knowledge, I would think in most cases means "proven beyond a perverse doubts" but actually it depends on the nature of the claim being made.

And so, both "There is a God," and "There are no such things as gods" can both be designated as "Knowledge" until such time as their negation can be proven.

I disagree for the reason stated in the reply at the bottom of page two. Epistemic justification is lacking in the case of the positive assertion which says "Gods exist". To count as knowledge, not only must a claim not be known to be false but it must also have good epistemic reasons that compel belief beyond a perverse doubt.

And are we planning on clarifying [the distinction between belief and knowledge] any time soon? :)

It is pretty well clarified now.

We are free to believe any proposition we wish to believe for any reason at all or for no reason. We are not free, however, to call such belief "knowledge" unless we can also demonstrate good epistemic reasons which compel belief beyond a perverse doubt.

Take for example the claim "Jesus walked on water." It is absolutely possible to believe that claim literally. No evidence is necessary. It can be accepted by faith in the Bible or by divine revelation or really for no reason at all.

It is not possible, however, given our physics, to rationally say "I know that Jesus walked on water because it says in the Bible that Jesus walked on water." Something has to give: either one's belief in the laws of physics or belief in the literal claim "Jesus walked on water."

It's possible for a person to murder 3000 people by acting on the belief that eternal life will be the reward. But it's IMPOSSIBLE to murder 3000 people by acting on the knowledge that such an act will lead to eternal life.

That is, assuming that murdering 3000 people cannot, in fact, lead to eternal life. According to The Bible, there have been many wars, and killing of entire other peoples, including men, women, children, and cattle, that was sanctioned by God on the road to Heaven. Until this is proven false, we cannot say that it cannot be "knowledge", and we (here) haven't actually begun any such refutation yet.

No. That is, no, unless it can be shown that there is an eternal life. We can believe anything for any reason or for no reason. Knowledge, however, requires that we have good epistemic justification or reasons to believe the things that we believe. Unless we know that there is eternal life, we cannot act on the knowledge that there is eternal life.

A nonevidenced or shabbily supported belief does not have to be proved wrong to be disbelieved. It is enough that there are no good reasons to believe that it is true.

"I suppose that might be true for people who are as smart as you are..."

If I was inclined towards cynicism, I might be tempted to take that as an insult...

Not meant as an insult at all. Your intelligence comes through loud and clear in your writing.

I can claim to know who my brother is, but there is always the remote possibility that that person is not my brother. Am I misusing language to call that kind of strong belief "knowledge"?

The only things that can be known infallibly and incorrigibly are truths of logic, tautologies, definitions, and those sorts of things. Any claim we make about the world, OTOH, is possibly mistaken. It's impossible to prove beyond ALL doubt that your brother is your brother. All you can do (and all anyone else can do) is to prove that your brother is your brother beyond a perverse doubt.

There is always some element of doubt, however minuscule that doubt may be, in our claims to knowledge.

Anura, it might help if you rephrased your comment.  I'm not quite sure what point you are trying to make.  In my opinion, all gods are imaginary, but I can't claim to know for a fact that they are imaginary.  That is just a reasonable conclusion to make from observations about how the world works and how people behave.

...No, of course it isn't a "misuse of language" to say that you know who your brother is assuming that you have justification for your belief.

I think that we agree about the fallibility of knowledge, but we are still left with the difference between "knowledge" and "belief", because we can certainly claim to have justifiable reasons for believing propositions that we do not consider "knowledge".  For example, I do not claim to "know" that gods do not exist, but I certainly do have a very strong belief that they do not.  And I can list justifications for maintaining that belief.

BTW, the kinds of things we can "know" for certain go well beyond logic--i.e. truth-preserving manipulations of symbols.  We can know our direct experiences with certainty.  That is the ground level of our cognitive system.  We may misinterpret the significance of experiences such as pain and pleasure, but we know what we are feeling.

sorry about my mistake  copernicus.Thats was a language problem. I owe you an apology. ]

No problem, anura.  My linguist's curiosity is getting the better of me.  What is your native language?  I'm guessing Russian (or at least Slavic), but I only have a vague intuition.