No, I'm still not home. :) A hotel with wireless will do. :)
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"But that is obviously not enough because you think you know it at 0.01 seconds after conception,"
Not necessarily. It wasn't in this thread but it was somewhere in this forum that I am perfectly willing to change my tune if it could be conclusively demonstrated that 'personhood' was not present until later in the development of the 'human.' The advantage- and reality- of the moment of conception is that it is utterly non-arbitrary. There is none of this erecting of criteria that changes and shifts and finds exceptions whenever you blink.
At the moment of conception you have all you need. You have an entirely new entity with new DNA, etc. It absolutely
will become what we all recognize to
indisputably be a person, assuming all goes well and no one intervenes.
Thus I am disappointed when you dismiss the burden of demonstration with a hand wave and a smiley, especially given what Cimics extracted from you regarding the death penalty. It would seem that if you can't conclusively demonstrate non-personhood to me or even to yourself then it is obvious where we should be placing the benefit of the doubt.
"You say that it is a serious problem for my view of consciousness"
Of consciousness? You mean personhood, right?
"Again, i would invoke the car analogy - at what point does a car become a car, and why?"
I will return to this point later, perhaps when I get home. I think it proves the opposite of what you think it proves, but for the moment I must let it go, although portions of my response will relate.
"There is no contradiction, to me, in the whole being more than the sum of its parts while still being contingent on those parts."
Perhaps you missed my clarification: "Also for clarification, I have no problem admitting that the 'physical stuff' is a component of humanity and personhood as we experience it."
So I have no problem the whole being 'contingent on those parts.' However, in order for the whole to be MORE then those parts, there needs to be a frame of reference outside the system of those parts for that MORE to be meaningful.
You deny that there exists anything except the physical system in which the parts exist in, therefore it is nonsensical (more precise then contradictory) to say that we are in fact more than the sum of our parts.
"You say that they never will, but i find it difficult to see how you can know that for sure."
I suppose you could take comfort in the notion that it might be conceivable that a million years from now humans might, just maybe, be able to pull it off, but surely there is something to be said about what we currently know, and accept it provisionally?
I can say it will never happen- for sure- provisionally. I see no evidence that it will ever happen. If you see evidence for it ever happening outside of science fiction stories (which I see you resorting to more often

) I'm happy to hear it.
"Theoretically i dont see why not, since the experience is largely sensory data which could potentially be reproduced, but clearly we are nowhere near being able to do such a thing at the moment."
Clearly not. :) Good, that's settled. You're right that theoretically- given reductionism- we certainly should be able to. But my contention is that personhood refutes reductionism.
"i don't need to be able to enter into the experience of something to be aware of its limitations."
You said that the pre-26 week doesn't feel pain and isn't aware. You say this because you are confident that the brain is not developed enough to sustain these phenomena. It seems to me that the only way you could test such a theory is to be able to enter into the pre-26er's experience of reality. Otherwise, its just supposition, assumption, and raw assertion. You think it all reduces to brain. It is not so much to ask that you
prove it before you allow the indiscriminate elimination of those prior to that point.
"Very Happy Supernaturalism then."
:)
Ok, let me explain. Think of it like algebra. x+2=5 Solve for x.
X, as you know, is 3. You could say that '3' is the 'explanation.' I would say that it is the logical deduction. It is not an appeal to magic or the supernatural. It is simple logic. Like:
A. Reductionism requires that everything can be explained in terms of the natural system without recourse to appealing to a transcending system.
B. Thus, according to reductionism, everything is no more and no less than the sum of its parts.
C. However, it is agreed that humans are more than the sum of their parts.
Therefore,
D. Reductionism is proved false.
E. Therefore, something transcendental exists.
This is not an invoking of magic, or supernaturalism, or ad hoc explanation. It is simple logic, like algebra.
"True, but you have to start somewhere."
I have no quibbles with you starting there. My quibble is with where you stop.
"i don't see why that makes a difference. Unless you're talking about bodily resurrection."
I might be. I don't want to get hung up on it. Yes, if I must restrict myself to the reductionist worldview in discussing human/person distinctions then the dead human poses a problem. But then it is my contention that the very nature of the human person strongly suggests that reductionism is false. So, I don't have any problem approaching the matter theologically at the point where it ceases to make sense to you as a materialist. Yes, I can see how that makes it ineffectual at that last step in the series in your mind but these 2 things seem important: 1., there were 50 steps (probably thousands) where the logic rang indisputably true up to the point of the 'singularity' that death is., 2., as long as my logic is consistent within the framework of my own system I don't see a problem.
Do you think that King is dead?
"What becomes of personhood in this thought experiment?"
I believe that this has been actually proposed- quantum teleportation. While it is fun to think about, do you really want to be appealing to fanciful science fiction hypotheticals to patch over the entrenched agnosticism that exists for your view of the pre-26er?
"In your opinion, if such a thing were possible, would the teleported crew member in the second case still be himself? Or would he be dead?"
On the reductionist view, this thought experiment isn't even interesting. :) Your only talking about making an exact copy of a human and going the next step of destroying the original. :) If reductionism is true, you can make copy upon copy. The molecules used to reconstuct the human (ala the teleporter) are not the same ones that were decomposed. This is like a computer hard drive which can be copied over and over and over again (imaged). You can do it because it is not more then the sum of its parts. :)
What would be required for the person to persist?
An Author. :)