of which we are a part of
subtract an "of"

would laws against adultery be an invasion of privacy?
yes.

...murder...

commiting the act would be an invasion of privacy to begin with, as for laws against it, i cannot see the coorelation to how it would invade your privacy. elaborate on it please.

ok, so, the next deductible question is:

Being that [laws against] adultery would be an invasion of privacy, would said invasion be considered necessary(as with pornography, drug use etc) if adultery is wrong?

edited in the bolded section to mean what i was intending to say.

This seems to be (as presented) more of a question regarding how much the government should (or should be able to) force people to be 'moral' in cases where the actions do not directly (but certainly indirectly, just like all actions) affect society.  I'm I correct in saying that is the fundamental question here?

would laws against adultery be an invasion of privacy?

I guess that depends in part on what you mean by privacy, but in legal circles it would be considered an invasion of privacy.  Sexual conduct is typically considered to be private.  Any real doubts on that in the US seem to be quelled by the decision in  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5013, 71 U.S.L.W. 4574, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 427, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5559, 2003 D.A.R. 7036 (2003)

The question, then, would be whether the invasion of privacy would be justified.  With adultery, you would have a stronger case than with homosexuality because a third party is directly affected.  Nevertheless, modern democratic societies have judged that the kind of harm that would be prevented is not worth the costs.  Not only have criminal sanctions disappeared, but so have civil sanctions.  There used to be a cause of action for "alienation of affections" in Texas, but there isn't anymore.

And I don't think that the issue is necessarily the severity of the harm, so much as it is the type of harm.  Choosing one's sexual partner implicates basic freedoms of determination and privacy interests.  So, government should keep its hands off, even when it is clear that the parties are doing wrong.  This is only true, of course, when the sexual activity is between consenting adults.

Your definition seems to be deceptive. You allow for only monogamy and adultery. You ignore celebacy and polygamy.

The question, then, would be whether the invasion of privacy would be justified.

Exactly...but that of course presupposes a definition of 'privacy' as determinded mainly by Supreme Court justices in the 1900s.  I don't know if we want to talk specifically about the laws of one nation (US, Britian, Thailand) or if this is to be discussing privacy in a general context of political theory.  Devil's Advocate, could you clear that up?

In that case, I think cimics says it all: Lawerence v. Texas.  The Supreme Court said that's what the law says so that's the law.  I was a 5-1-3 decision so there is room to question the interpretation of the law, but as the what the law acutally is, there's no question that under current law it is an unjust and illegal invasion of privacy.

2 - Actions that do none of the above should be considered legal, even if morally questionable. It is up to the individual to decide whether or not they should take part in these activities. Examples: Adultery, homosexuality, pornography, etc. It's an even longer list.

Of course I've no experience in matters of legality, so feel free to ignore my opinions on this...

...but, yes, as there is no harm caused by adultery (assuming the two concenting adults or teens took proper precautions), it would be a gross breach of privacy to illegalize it. Even though adultery is not something I agree with... it's something that must be tolerated.

So in other words, I side with cimics.

But I would take issue somewhat with your characterization.  Adultery definately DOES cause harm to others when we are talking about cheating on your spouse, which is what I understood DA to be talking about (since it keyed off one of my posts in another thread).  But my position is that even some things that harm non-participants should be off-limits to government.  Name-calling is emotionally harmful, for example, but there shouldn't be a law against it.  That doesn't mean, of course, that social pressure cannot be exerted against people who do such things.

Name-calling is emotionally harmful, for example, but there shouldn't be a law against it.

yet hate crimes exist.
using certain derogatory names in a hurtful manner can get someone into alot of legal trouble.

yet hate crimes exist.

What we ordinarily think of as "hate crimes" are acts that are criminal without the "hate" element but are considered worse because of the "hate" element.  Murdering someone on account of race, for example.  There are not ordinarily "hate" crimes (in America anyway) that consist SOLELY of the "hate" element.  The First Amendment is a big reason for that.  And I tend to agree with that policy.

More to the point, however, the question is whether certain hurtful behavior ought to be criminalized (or otherwise subject to Government restraint), and my basic point is that there are some behaviors, even though hurtful, that Government should not do anything about.

using certain derogatory names in a hurtful manner can get someone into alot of legal trouble.

It depends on the nature of the "hurtful manner" that is being talked about.  Libel and slander are actionable in civil court, but the "harm" there goes beyond emotionally harming the object of the speech, extending to reputation and even financial consequences.  

And that brings up another issue: the nature of government regulation of conduct.  Criminal sanctions are not the only way in which government plays a role in regulating conduct.  Civil sanctions also play a large role, and clearly, some things that should not be subject to criminal liability ought to be subject to civil liability.  

In the case of adultery, I would submit that permissible sanctions are very limited.  As nrthsll suggests, taking that into account in divorce proceedings would be legitimate, although I don't necessarily agree that it should be an automatic "forfeit every right you have" type of sanction.  The degree of sanction involved ought to turn upon the facts of the particular case.  But divorce proceedings are a very limited case -- essentially the parties have implicated the government through a contractual-type relationship.  That's a little bit different than government interposing itself (civilly or criminally) where it was not invited.