Some people think that it is an overwhelming and daunting task to evaluate competing worldviews.  I don't completely disagree.  Skeptics will go further and argue that when one begins looking into supernatural worldviews, there are so many and there can be so many, its much simpler to ignore them all.  On the other hand, if you do find some that are mutually contradictory, ie, this supernatural view says 'x' and this view says 'non-x' then if you establish the former you've eliminated the latter.  There are ways to exclude whole swaths of both naturalistic and supernaturalistic worldviews in this way. 

Another mechanism, though, is by studying the nature of foundational evidence the worldview offers.  This post will not relate to all worldviews, but three that it does relate to is atheism, Mormonism, and Islam.

Let it be assumed that the more epistemologically robust a worldview is the more we ought to take it seriously as respect its claims all the more.  A worldview that comes based on a skimpy epistemology may be true... but offers less ways to validate or invalidate it.  These sorts of worldviews are the ones that multiply endlessly.  The kinds of worldviews that can't are the ones that most deserve our attention.

Let's take both Mormonism and Islam to begin with.  Both Mormonism and Islam begin basically with a single man claiming he received a revelation. This revelation was later transcribed and recorded.  No other person witnessed Mohammed receiving a revelation from a supernatural entity.  No other person witnessed Joseph Smith receiving his tablets from a supernatural entity.  In the case of Smith, there is at least the claim that others saw the tablets, but the tablets, of course, are no more.

What we have is an epistemological bottleneck.  The entire worldview comes to us through the testimony of a single man.  If we had some external way to take the measure of the man, it would be one thing, but we don't even have that.  Furthermore, in the case of these two examples, the insistence is that a previous message (the Bible) from a supernatural entity (God) had become corrupted and so direct intervention was required.

Both the Mormons and the Muslims, and the Muslims in particular, emphasize the purity of their text as evidence for the legitimacy of their worldview, but this begs the question, doesn't it, as to how God could preserve the BoM and the Koran but not the OT/NT.  In contrast, while we're here, note that Christians never said that the OT was flawed.  They argued that the OT spoke truly of something which was fulfilled.  They did not set aside as corrupted, but adopted as trustworthy but completed.

Now, you could go ahead and spend more time investigating the BoM and the Koran and looking for other ways to test the strengths of these worldviews, and I certainly would suggest it.  However, it is certainly a good clue right from the beginning... the courage that these worldviews had in formulating their central claims was really not that courageous.  They are specifically set up so as to be, in principle, unfalsifiable.

Let it be assumed that a more robust epistemology will be, in principle at least but in practice if at all possible, falsifiable.

I mentioned atheism.  This may seem counter-intuitive, but yes, atheism.  In particular, I speak of the strong atheist, the philosophical naturalist, but this epistemological bottleneck exists even in other brands.  Where is the epistemological bottleneck?

The epistemological bottleneck is the individual himself.  You tend to see skeptics taking their own experiences of reality as normative of everyone else's experiences of reality.  Thus, if they have never experienced the supernatural, the attitude is then that the supernatural is not likely.  The source and norm for the atheist reduces to the atheist.  Like Mormonism and Islam, it is virtually set up to be unfalsifiable.

The more robust epistemology does not ignore the fact that we have to start with our own experience of reality, but it understands that our experience of reality is limited to, well, our self.  A more courageous epistemology takes accounts from others about their experience of reality, both today, and yesterday, and evaluates them (preferrably in non-question begging fashion).

It may seem that this is exactly what the empiricist is doing- pointing to everyone's experiences about general rules of nature- but as much of the world currently and in the past has acknowledged something beyond the natural as existing and occasionally interacting, the accounts of these experiences ought to be incorporated as potentially valid, as well.   However, you tend to see these experiences derided or dismissed.  And why?

Because the individual atheist has not himself experienced such things.  I am a theist, and I haven't experienced such things, either.  But I refuse to make my own experiences the rule by which all other experiences are to be measured.  Its one thing to start your inquiry into the nature of existence with yourself- you can't help but do that- its another to make yourself the sum example of everyone's experience.  Ie, make yourself into an epistemological bottleneck.

In conclusion, I submit that one can begin an inquiry into the nature of reality and begin to reduce possible worldviews quickly enough.  If I am right that epistemologically robust worldviews demand our attention more than those that are not, then Mormonism and Islam (1.5 billion adherents out of 6 billion people) can reasonably be excluded.  Atheism takes more work, because in principle at least it tries to appeal to an experience of natural laws which we all experience.  Its mistake is in dismissing, based usually only on the experience of that particular atheist, other phenomena that are experienced by people around the world, both past and present.