I need another thread to contribute to like I need another hole in the head.  Unfortunately, I think that this is something that deserves discussion now rather than later.  Sooner would have been better.  I will be going off memory, here.

Explanatory 'models,'  or if you prefer, 'paradigms.'

When one is trying to interpret or explain data, it is often the case that there is not enough data to derive a complete description.  We create 'models' from that data, and then as new data emerges, we test to see how well the model holds up.

Commonly, we talk about 'scientific models' but a 'model' can be used in a wide variety of contexts.  In principle, they all work the same, even if the phenomena they are interpreting is of a different sort and the mechanisms by which we test that model might be different.

For a book that I thought did an excellent job talking about models as well as the influences both behind and within the model, let me suggest Kuhn's "The Copernican Revolution."  http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/KUHCOX.html

The geocentric model did not exist in a vacuum.  There were assumptions and motives behind interpreting the astronomical data in light of that model.  What I think people fail to acknowledge is that the geocentric model is technically feasible.  (See Copernicus's (doh! the Copernicus of this forum!) and Rareairpug's thread where it is agreed that one can still in some senses agree that the earth is the center of the universe).  To make it work, they were required to create new assumptions or new mechanisms or both.  The more famous of these were 'epicycles.'  The heliocentric model could cover the same data, but with less ad hoc additions.  But that is not to say that the heliocentric model did not come with its own set of assumptions.

Now, I use this example because it prompts certain relevant concepts.  First of all, not every model is contrasted perfectly with every other one.  The 'geocentric' model and the 'heliocentric' model were competing to cover the same data.   But the 'heliocentric' model has no comparison to the Standard Model explanatory system to the Dead Sea Scrolls.   The two models are apples and oranges, and even if we found overlap (arguably, the SM of the DSS could fit inside the heliocentric model), we would not be reasonable in trying to explain the Copper Scroll in light of the heliocentric model or pulsars in light of the SM of the DSS.

Now, when you do have two models that are apples and apples, you have a situation where they are attempting to cover the same data (eg. geo vs helio, as mentioned above).  One epistemological test to see which model is right is to take the one that has less epicycles.  The presence of 'epicycles' usually speaks back to the assumptions in the model.  But that doesn't mean that another model might not have epicycles, too.  They just might come from different assumptions, or they might overlap assumptions and have the same 'epicycle.'

Newton's astronomical model is a case in point.  While very simple and requiring very little by way of 'extra assumptions,' it nonetheless did rest on assumptions, and there were phenomena that required 'epicycles' to explain.   Enter Einstein, whose model was able to do everything that Newton's was able to do, but without those particular 'epicycles.'

This is all foreplay.  The context behind this thread are some of the 'creatonist' threads going on, but it has wider application.  From the point of view of a creationist, it should be evident that 'creationism' is not apples and apples with 'evolution.'  

Creationism is what we might call a 'theory of everything.'  That means that it aims to explain everything.  'Evolution' declines to address abiogenesis, and a horde of other matters.  While the two aim to explain some of the same data, creationism aims to explain much more.

How did we get here?  Creationism has an answer.  Evolution says "We just assume abiogenesis.  We'd prefer not to address abiogenesis, thanks."

How can we trust our own minds?  Creationism has an answer.  Evolution says, "We just assume that our thoughts are rational and that we can reliably make judgements about reality.  We'd prefer not to address epistemology, thanks."

Why is a sunrise beautiful?  Creationism has an answer.  Evolution says, "Well, somehow I guess it was selected for.  We know why women are 'beautiful, though, does that count?"

So, in a very real sense, Creationism is to the heliocentric model as evolution is to the Standard Model of the dead sea Scrolls.

The very interesting thing is that proponents of the SM in the DSS wish to dictate to the heliocentrists how they ought to interpret everything.  That's just a little wierd.

And that's the next point.  As an apples to apples model aims to cover the same data and account for future data, it stands to reason that they will be applying the assumptions and conclusions of the model differently.

By way of example, assume Model A and B both aim to cover data  [1, 2, 3].   Now let's assume that both Model A and B both ADEQUATELY cover that data set.  How can you distinguish between the two models if they both adequately cover the same data?  Well, one way would be how well future data remains consistent with the model.

But that raises an interesting point.  If data point #4 is added to the set to be explained and remains consistent with Model B, that surely means that B has been substantiated and strengthened.  So, now you turn to Model A and you start taunting it and teasing it and making fun of it,

"Hey Model A, eat my shorts!  #4 is consistent with my model and not yours, I'm the superior model!"

If its true, then maybe B is speaking the truth.  But what if Model A can turn around and say,

"Hey Model B, just stick it.  #4 is consistent with MY model, too."

If that is true, then we are still in the same situation, except now both models adequately cover the set [1,2,3,4].

How does this apply to recent conversations on this board?  A good example is Broken's 'transposable elements.'  He raises TEs as an example that substantiates his model, but he fails to recognize that the Creationism model is perfectly able to accomodate that same phenomena.  He is like model B above, trying to razz model A, when model A covers the same data.

Now, the thing is that if you cannot understand how these dynamics work, and especially how creationists don't 'ignore' data, but interpret them in light of their own explanatory model- and yield's explanations that are consistent with that model- you really shouldn't be offering any kind of opinion at all on what you think of creationism, and in particular Young Earth Creationism.  You should be especially silent if you don't even take the time to learn how and in what ways the YECcer goes about handling that same data.

And this raises a final point.  Every YECcer that I know is a firm proponent of 'science,' when 'science' is defined specifically to relate to direct experimentation.  Science has abandoned this narrow method of inquiry.  As such, I coined a word to describe my own view, which is an 'experimentalist,' and I'd be willing to bet that other YECcers would be willing to join me in that assessment, at least in these contexts.

I pointed out that the superiority of a model (apples and apples) can be distinguished in part as to whether or not new data is able to remain consistent with the model.  However, you can frame a model so that it can explain anything and everything.  That's what the whole "Invisible Pink Unicorn" thing is all about.  From an experimentalist's POV, a much more robust epistemological challenge to a model is not merely how well it can continue to interpret data in a way that is consistent with it, but how well it can open itself up to being specifically refuted, or how it can generate tests that don't merely create data that is 'consistent,' but rather data that is independently corroborative.

Thus, from my POV, offering me a thousand pieces of evidence that is only 'consistent' with the evolution model as evidence for its superiority gets old pretty fast.  Its value as a mere explanatory system may be grand, but what concrete predictions can it tell us that are anything more than trivial.... and not also covered by the YEC model?

And that raises my final point.  Allegedly, evolution is a 'scientific' model.  Well, I make no claims at all that YEC is a 'scientific model.'  That doesn't in the slightest think that I do not think there are 'scientific' elements, both from an experimentalist POV and the modern scientific view, but as the YEC covers non-empirical realities as well as empirical ones, it is foolish to think in anyway that it is allowed to restrict itself from the 'hard questions' the way that certain explanatory models are allowed to.

As for an apples and apples model to compare and contrast with YEC, I don't think there is one.  Evolutionists themselves can rattle off a list of things that they don't think evolution speaks to.  Intelligent Design is still not an apple or an orange.  It is a bananna.

I can't say that I speak for all people who think that a creation is the BEST explanation for all that we see, with fewer epicycles, etc, etc, but I think I speak for a lot of them when I say that if you cannot appreciate the above aspects of how we approach the world, you ought to remain silent altogether.  Furthermore, we don't appreciate it when our position is rejected before it is even heard based on the fact that in a model that is itself 'covered' by our model, certain things have certain interpretations.

Clearly, we'll be looking at the same data but obtaining different interpretations.  Insofar as your model is strengthened by this consistency, YECcers hardly care.  Our model can deal with it, too.  Oh, and it can cover abiogenesis, too.  

So, YEC covers:  [1 to Everything] and evolution covers [5,6, 12, 19, 20.2], conveniently leaving aside how 1-4, etc.

So, let me tell you how that comes across to me.   If one way to distinguish between a model is to see how well it interprets future facts, it seems to me that as evolution comes across future facts that are inconsistent, rather than that being assessed as a blow to the model, it just cuts it loose from requiring an explanation within that model.  That's like a 'reverse epicycle.'  

Anywa, to conclude this long post, let me simply point out that as a 'theory of everything,' the reasonable skeptic will carefully explore how a creationist interprets the same data rather than impose the interpretational conclusions generated from a different model replete with its own assumptions.  And, by golly, you'll keep in mind in your analysis how well apples are being compared with apples.